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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
charitable corporations), the Massachusetts Supreme Court reached the con-
clusion that the legislature could not have intended to abolish by implication
the common law defense of a charitable corporation, applying the canon of
statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be strictly construed. Zoulalian v. New England Sanitorium & Benevolent
Ass'n (1918) 230 Mass. 102, 119 N. E. 686. A similar result was reached in
New York, but here the decision was based on the fact that the employments
covered were limited to employments "in a trade, business, or occupation
carried on by the employer for pecuniary gain". Dillon v. St. Patrick
Cathedral (1922) 234 N. Y. 225, 137 N. E. 311. The sequel of this case is
interesting. In the same year it was held that where the charitable cor-
poration carried insurance, the insurer could not invoke the immunity of the
charity. Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital (1923) 236 N. Y. 268, 140 N. E.
694. In 1929 the Statute was amended so as to extend it to any person, firm,
or corporation employing four or more persons. N. Y. Laws (1929) ch. 304;
C. S. N. Y. (Cahill 1930) ch. 66 sec. 3 (18). This extension is logical in New
York where the charitable corporation would be liable at common law to a
servant.
The words of the Missouri Statute interpreted literally are broad enough
to include charitable corporations, for employer is defined to include every
"corporation". However, 1he second subdivision of the same section shows
that this term is not to be taken literally, for "municipal corporations" are
only included if the body elects to accept the chapter by law or ordinance.
R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3304. The Statute expressly provides that it shall be
conclusively presumed to apply to all employers who do not elect to reject it,
by filing a notice with the commission (which must also be posted at the
plant). R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3300. The whole theory of this election seems
to be that it is an election between liability under the Statute or liability at
common law. It would hardly seem that such an elective liability could be
meant to destroy an absolute defense, which would have prevented there being
any liability at all. Rules which are based on public policy should not be
changed by such shadowy implications. Of course, charitable corporations
can avoid all future trouble by promptly filing the notice of election with the
commission. G. W. S., '33.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAw-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-The
defendant negroes were convicted in Alabama of the crime of rape upon two
white girls. They were not given an opportunity before trial to communicate
with relatives and friend to attempt to secure counsel. At the time they were
arraigned, the trial judge stated he appointed all the members of the local
bar as their counsel, but did not designate any particular attorney to aid the
defendants until the case was actually called for trial. The result was that
the counsel finally assigned was unprepared to defend the case and the de-
fendants were deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. From a de-
cision of the Alabama Supreme Court affirming the conviction, certiorari
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was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. He rd: The fact that
the Sixth Amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel to anl persons
tried for crimes against the United States does not prevent the inclusion of
that right among those essential to the existence of due process of law. Be-
cause of the fundamental nature of the right, failure to provide counsel for
the accused who, illiterate and indigent, were unable to procure assistance for
themselves, amounted to a denial of due process of law.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The clause has
as many definitions as definers. As regards procedure, it has been said that
one enjoys due process of law when he is possessed of the rights and privileges
recognized by the common law before the American Revolution, although due
process does not require that he have all of them. Hurtado v. State of Cali-
fornia (1884) 110 U. S. 516. It is generally acknowledged that the guarantee
*does not operate as an assurance that a certain prescribed procedure will be
followed. Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North (1926) 271 U. S. 41. It does,
however, include a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Cooke V. United
States (1924) 267 U. S. 517; 3 Willoughby, Constitutional Law (2nd ed.
1929) sec. 1122.
The principal case presents the question whether the right to be heard, as
an element of due process of law, includes the right to have the effective as-
sistance of counsel. At common law there was no such right; in felony and
treason cases the accused was absolutely denied the assistance of counsel.
1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed., 1927) 696 et seq. American
state .constitutions contain provisions specifically guaranteeing the right to
'counsel. 8 R. C. L. 83. Some state decisions preserve the right to the ac-
cused because of these constitutional provisions alone. Delk v. State (1896)
99 Ga. 667, 26 S. E. 752; Williams v. Commonwealth (1908) 33 Ky. L. 330,
110 S. W. 339; State v. Yoes (1910) 67 W. Va. 546, 68 S. E. 181. Others,
although deciding on the basis of constitutional provisions, view the right
as a fundamental one "going to the very essence of the fairness of the court
hearings". Decker v. State (1925) 113 Oh. St. 512, 150 N. E. 74; Carpenter
v. County of Dane (1859) 9 Wis. 274.
From the fact that the Sixth Amendment specifically guarantees the right
to counsel it would seem, if the ordinary rules of construction were adopted,
that general clauses in the same document, i. e. the identically worded due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, do not include it.
Cf. Hurtado v. State of California, supra (where such reasoning was used
-with reference to the necessity of indictments in felony cases). But it has
been held on other points that a right is not excluded as necessary to due
-process of law merely because it is guaranteed by one of the first eight amend-
ments. Twining v. New Jersey (1908) 211 U. S. 78. For instance, the
guarantee against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation has been held to be included in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago (1897) 166 U. S.
226. The same has been held in regard to the freedom of speech and the
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press. Stromberg v. State of California (1931) 283 U. S. 359; Near v. State
of Minnesota ex rel. Olson (1931) 283 U. S. 697.
If the reasoning of the Hurtado case is applied, the conclusion is that the
principal case is erroneous. If, however, there are considered the American
view of the fundamental nature of the right to counsel and the complexity of
legal procedure in relation to the capacities of the accused persons in the
instant case, the result is just. The opinion carefully limits the effect of the
decision so as not to hold that every accused person must be represented by
counsel. The decision only applies if the circumstances of a particular case
are such that the denial of counsel amounts to a denial of a fair hearing and
hence is a denial of due process of law. N. P., '34.
CONTRACTS-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE-SILENCE OF OFFEREE.-The defend-
ant bank wired a request to its attorney for a statement of his fee in the event
of the compromise of a suit then pending in New York. The then existing
agreement was based on a contingent fee. The plaintiff replied that his
charge would be $12,500. The defendant never answered directly, but
ordered the plaintiff to discontinue the suit in the New York courts. The
bank refused to pay the $12,500 after a compromise had been effected through
other channels. Held: The relations between the parties were such that
silence on the part of the defendant was conduct which misled the plaintiff
and amounted to an acceptance of the plaintiff's offer. Laredo Nat. Bank
v. Gordon (C. C. A. 5, 1932) 61 F. (2d) 906.
It is an established rule of contract law that ordinarily the silence of an
offeree is not acceptance. Beach v. United States (1912) 226 U. S. 243;
Carnahan Mfg. Co. v. Beebe-Bowles Co. (1916) 80 Or. 124, 156 Pac. 584;
Clark, Law of Contracts (4th ed., 1931) 26. There are, however, instances
wherein silence and inaction may operate as acceptance. If the offeree exer-
cises dominion over the chattel or thing offered, silence will be acceptance
when there are no circumstances showing a contrary intention. This is illus-
trated by the receipt and reading of a newspaper for which the offeree did
not subscribe and which he did not want. Austin v. Bunge (1911) 156 Mo.
App. 286, 137 S. W. 618. If the offeree receives benefits from services which
he could reasonably reject and the circumstances, as perceived by a reasonable
man, demonstrate that compensation is expected, silence will operate as ac-
ceptance. For instance, there was held to be a contract to pay the reasonable
value of the services performed when the defendant stood by and allowed the
plaintiff to rebuild a party wall when he knew the plaintiff expected com-
pensation. Day v. Caton (1876) 119 Mass. 513. If, because of previous
dealings or other circumstances, the offeree has led the offeror to believe
silence shows acceptance, it will be considered such. Thus, failure to return
a shipment of hides was held to be an acceptance when in previous dealings
there had often been no positive act of acceptance and yet both parties had
considered that contracts were formed. Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co. (1893)
158 Mass. 194, 33 N. E. 495. The view was extended when it was held that
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